

# THE BRITISH EMPIRE

BBC tv TIME-LIFE BOOKS 25p  
No.88



THE WIND  
OF CHANGE  
HITS AFRICA

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No.88

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**ROY LEWIS**, author of the text sections of this issue, took degrees at Oxford and the London School of Economics. His distinguished career in journalism includes a stint as *The Economist's* Washington, D.C. Correspondent; Commonwealth Correspondent for *The Times*, and, later, Assistant Foreign Editor, specializing on Africa and North America. His most recent book is *The British in Africa*.

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**Binders** - These may be ordered at £1.15 including V.A.T. for the Standard edition and £1.92 including V.A.T. for the Deluxe edition, either individually or on subscription. Orders, with remittance, should be sent to *British Empire Binders*, BBC Publications, P.O. Box No. 126, London SE1 5JZ.

**NOTE:** All above payments should be crossed cheque/P.O.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:** (t=top; b=bottom; l=left; r=right; c=centre). Cover: Paul Popper Ltd. Inside back cover: The Parker Gallery, London. Associated Press Ltd. 2438/9, 2448, 2450c, 2452bl, 2460/1t, b, 2463; Camera Press Ltd. 2444/5, 2451bl, br, 2454/5; Conway Picture Library 2442/3; Central Press Photos 2462t; Keystone Picture Agency 2450ll, br, 2451t, 2459, 2460l, 2462b, 2464; Press Association Ltd. 2461br; Radio Times Hulton Picture Library 2437; United Press International 2452/3, 2456, 2458. PHOTOGRAPHER: Eileen Tweedy inside back cover. MAP: Roger Pring 2440.

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Published by Time-Life International (Nederland) B.V. in co-operation with the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Distributed in the U.K. by Time-Life International Ltd. and BBC Publications.

Printed in England by Jarrold and Sons Ltd. Norwich.



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**Cover:** British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan set aside his usual combination of bland charm and suave statesmanship to warn the all-white South African parliament in 1960 that "the wind of change" was blowing through Africa.

# AFRICA'S WIND OF CHANGE

Britain seized the bulk of her African empire during the late 19th Century when the European "scramble" for the dark continent was at its height. Concerned more with preventing possession by other major powers than with possession itself, Britain treated her new colonies as backwaters. It was not until after the Second World War that British governments turned

their proper attention to African economic development. But this was no longer enough to satisfy African demands. Nationalism was stirring, inspired by decolonization in Asia and by Western-educated politicians at home. By 1960 the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had come to recognize "the wind of change" blowing through Africa. It was but a sign of the hurricane to come.

Emirs from Northern Nigeria crowd together for a ritual photography session beneath the Union Jack during a social visit to London in the autumn of 1934.



On February 3, 1960, the South African parliament was listening to an address by its guest, Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain. He had thanked the members for their hospitality, praised the progress of the Union, and dilated on the growing trade between the two countries and Britain's investment in South African industrialization. The nods of approval ended, however, when Macmillan proceeded to give his impressions of his visit to Ghana, Nigeria and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on his way to Cape Town. "In the 20th Century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation-states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in people who have for centuries lived in dependence on some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia. Many countries there pressed their claim to an independent national life. Today the same thing is happening in Africa, and the most striking of the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness. . . . The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact."

The South Africans did not like it. They did not consider that African political consciousness was – or needed to be – a fact unless weak-minded liberals in charge of the affairs of the decadent colony-owning states of Europe let it become so by pandering (as the South Africans felt they were doing) to "black agitators" and "Communists." The South African Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, rose to thank Macmillan on a note of some asperity. In his reply, he defended Apartheid as providing the answer to African tribal (rather than national) aspirations, the theme of his lectures to Macmillan all that week. What particularly incensed the South Africans was the British Prime Minister's suggestion that Afrikaner nationalism, which had finally triumphed over British culture in the Union with the election of Dr. Daniel Malan and the Nationalist party in 1948, was simply the first of the African nationalisms to



Harold Macmillan astonishes South African M.P.s in 1960 with his "wind of change" speech.

develop. They thought this a malicious and derogatory comparison, and they objected to a public statement from such an authority that black African nationalism existed, fearing that this would bring the phenomenon about.

The press seized at once on the phrase "the wind of change." Macmillan got a polite but cool send-off a few days later. Then, on March 21, 69 African demonstrators were shot dead by police at Sharpeville, which suggested to many that Macmillan's analysis was more accurate than even he knew. On May 31, 1961, South Africa became a republic, forced out of the Commonwealth on account of its racial policy. This result was one that Macmillan deplored, fearing that mutual intolerance would spread among Commonwealth members. Yet Macmillan only made explicit in Cape Town what had been implicitly accepted in London for some years. Until the late 1950s, however, only a few well-informed people realized quite how rapidly Africa would follow Asia into the era of self-assertive and often anti-Western national states.

Compared with Asia, Africa was backward, considered to be lacking in culture and education, still raw from "savagery," and needing much development before a

middle class and an educated élite emerged in numbers sufficient to underpin a measure of responsible local government. The belief that Africa could remain colonial while Asia lived independent did not appear inconsistent to British minds in the years just after the war. The West Indies, once they had achieved federation, seemed an earlier candidate for independence. In the early 1950s plans were on paper for a huge new Colonial Office building near Parliament Square and the recruitment of men to the colonial service went on much as before. The Colonial Office firmly rejected suggestions for the creation of a multi-national Commonwealth administrative and technical service which would help African and other colonies to move easily to responsible government on a sound, but not exclusively British, basis.

To many businessmen, including those with great enterprises in Africa, it seemed that for another 20 or 30 years the continent would provide a new and expanding frontier for European enterprise and energies, a boomland which modern technology would open up as darkest Africa had never been opened up previously – a penetration not just by railways, but by motorways, road transport, airways, hotel

and residential developments, mineral extraction, dams and irrigation and, above all, by vast agricultural developments springing from new botanical and chemical discoveries. Indeed, the post-war Labour government decided to take Africa by storm with the great "groundnut scheme" in Tanganyika, which was to demonstrate how modern machinery could simultaneously tame Africa and feed Britain. The scheme failed because of pests, drought and poor administration. Other great developments, such as the Kariba Dam, the Volta River scheme, and Uganda's copper and Ripon Falls barrage went ahead, however. "Eurafrica" in this sense was a live commercial concept of great value.

The Colonial Office had a broad, if

vague, strategy for its African colonies. This was to increase public investment and to encourage the development of large, economically viable political unions mainly under white leadership. The first of these to emerge was the federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which, after several years of gestation, was inaugurated without much consideration of African views in 1953. It was hoped that, probably under white Kenyan leadership, there would also emerge an East African grouping of Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika, which already had a regional economic customs union with a secretariat to run common services such as railways and telecommunications. In West Africa, however, circumstances dictated a plan


to bring forward the most advanced and wealthy colony, the Gold Coast, which had prospered on cocoa, and seemed simple to run even by inexperienced African hands; around it a number of West African common services with Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria were built up and developed.

It was an ideal which ignored obvious realities. It took no account of the pace of independence in North Africa. Under President Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptians revived their demand for the unity of the Nile Valley under Egyptian sovereignty, and the Foreign Office promptly countered by promising the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan its independence free of ties either to London or Cairo. But in 1956 the fiasco of the Anglo-French seizure of the Suez Canal, which Nasser had nationalized, and their humiliating withdrawal in the face of the world's, and especially President Eisenhower's disapproval, exposed to all Africans able to read or listen to a radio the weakness of their colonial masters. Independence for colonial peoples was on show much nearer than Delhi or Jakarta. It could be seen in Sudan, built not on years of apprenticeship but on sheer political determination and the discovery that Britain had little stomach for the use of force. Throughout the continent, African nationalists were already waiting in the wings, determined to occupy the centre of the stage whatever the Colonial Office's careful scenario might say.

African nationalism (at least on a tribal level) is probably as old as imperialism in the continent. There were revolts against the British in the 19th Century and there is certainly a continuity between the demands of the early rebels and those of the liberators who asserted their personalities and discontents in the 1930s. In the early 20th Century a number of African pentecostal sects sprang up, the leaders of which were often acclaimed as messiahs. For the most part, they avoided violence, but predicted that the white man, for all his maxim guns, was a passing phenomenon; there was always a political tinge to the religious message. Orthodox Western Christianity itself contributed enormously to the growth of African nationalism. The missionaries arrived early in Africa, and their message



White South Africans celebrate their country's new republican status on May 31, 1961.



that in the eyes of God all men (and women) are equal could not but make their listeners wonder about earthly inequality. The mission schools, furthermore, taught young Africans at least the rudiments of the techniques and intellectual disciplines that had enabled the Europeans to conquer Africa. The Bible gave Africans a vernacular that was often revolutionary, and this, and the increasing knowledge of English, brought future leaders into touch with the ideas and writings of American Negro leaders such as Marcus Garvey, Edward Blyden and W.B. du Bois. Africans, too, had always had some access to British universities and professional institutions, although the onset of "high imperialism" (1890-1914) temporarily diminished this, as it temporarily broke the long tradition of African journalism which goes back to the 1840s.

In West Africa loyalty to British culture ran high until the 1930s. J.E. Casely-Hayford, a Gold Coast lawyer, who inaugurated the National Congress of West Africa in 1918 advocated no more than local self-rule under British sovereignty. Even that seemed presumptuous to British officials and traders. So far from accepting that the spread of British education should naturally produce an élite of African leaders capable of working with their white confreres (as happened in the Indian Civil Service), the British colonial administrators looked on educated Africans with disfavour. Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of Nigeria, set the tone in a speech in 1920: "It can only be described as farcical to suppose that . . . continental Nigeria can be represented by a handful of gentlemen drawn from half-a-dozen coastal towns - men born and bred in British administered towns who, in the safety of British protection, have peacefully pursued their studies under British teachers, in British schools, in order to enable them to become ministers of the Christian religion or learned in the laws of England, whose eyes are fixed not upon African native history or tradition or policy, nor upon their own tribal obligations and duties to their natural rulers which immemorial custom should impose on them, but upon political theories evolved by Europeans to fit a wholly different environment."

Even the most moderate manifestation of an educated African middle class so frightened the colonial governors that they began to strengthen the power of the chiefs. They were encouraged to humiliate educated Africans as "verandah boys" when these ventured into their territory and "undesirables" were excluded altogether from some areas except under special permit. In the end, the policy was fatal to the chiefs and self-defeating for the British. In the past, the chiefs had held authority only so long as they ruled well or could maintain themselves against pretenders; the process of "de-stooling" - removing those who failed - was almost as traditional in the Gold Coast as changing the government at Westminster. They now became, in the eyes of the people, agents, even bully boys, of the district commissioners, and even those who ruled wisely were seen as puppets of the British. The lid could not be kept on. In 1935 Dr. J.B. Danquah launched the Gold Coast Youth Conference in Accra. In Nigeria, Herbert Macaulay, with Wallace Johnson of Sierra Leone, formed the Nigerian National Democratic Party. All vigorously advocated a policy of "autonomy within the British Empire."

Macaulay dressed as the perfect Englishman, though his newspapers often bitterly criticized the arrogance of the British in Africa. He became powerful in the Lagos town council, but Nigerian political organization did not really begin until the arrival in 1937, from the United States by way of Accra, of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. He had degrees from Howard, Pennsylvania and Lincoln universities. He edited a paper in Accra from 1934 to 1937, then moving to Lagos propounded a new and progressive nationalism in his paper, the *West African Pilot*, which he edited from 1937 to 1945. It made "Zikism" a powerful force. H.O. Davies, who had worked under Professor Harold Laski in London, helped to build the new nationalism, and established 50 branches of the Youth Movement in the south. In 1944, these men founded the political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. (The trust territory of the Cameroons was administered as part of Nigeria. The northern part is now part of Nigeria. The Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroon.)

The influence of these parties, councils, youth movements and voluntary associations, and above all of the nationalist newspapers, is attested by Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, who like many young men in the 1930s, was bitterly anti-white to a degree unsuspected by colonial officials. Struck by family misfortune, Awolowo worked to get himself an education and eventually became a teacher before going successively into journalism, business and politics. He wrote: "We were regular and voracious readers of the Lagos *Daily News*, of which Herbert Macaulay was proprietor and editor . . . an inflammatory sheet, ultra radical, intensely nationalistic, virulently and implacably anti-white. Africans who were friendly with white men, or who went to the length of dining and dining with them, were denounced as imperialist agents. . . . It was one of our aims and objects to demonstrate our contempt for and equality with the white man whenever an opportunity presented itself. . . . It was not until 1953, a year after I had been in office as . . . leader of government business in the Western Region of Nigeria that I sincerely felt free to fraternize and eat with white officials."

Africans recognized, however, that European-style education - and preferably education abroad - was the key to freedom in the modern world. Contacts could be made more easily overseas, where minds were broader than those of the missionary teachers and colonial officials, and where democracy could be inspected in action. In the 1930s the numbers of young Africans who flocked abroad increased. They included Jomo Kenyatta, Hastings Banda, H.O. Davies, Kwame Nkrumah, Obafemi Awolowo and dozens more who were to make their names in the 1950s. In Britain their Mecca was the London School of Economics, where Professor Laski taught political science with a Socialist bent, and where they met many strong anti-Empire figures in the British Labour party. A comparable development was taking place in Paris, where black Frenchmen such as Lamin Gueye, Leopold Senghor and Gabrielle D'Arbussier congregated to discuss African rights in terms of French revolutionary tradition; some black political contacts were made across the Channel.

# MIXED HARVEST

Only at the last gasp of Empire did Britain seriously attempt the economic development of her overseas possessions. With the election of a Labour government in 1945, money began to pour into the colonies, particularly those in Africa, and a Colonial Development Corporation was set up to provide them with public utilities. Despite the economic potential of Africa, not all the money was well-spent. The scheme to grow groundnuts in Tanganyika was meant to boost the local economy and supply margarine for the austere post-war British dinner-table. But the project was ill-prepared and turned into a disastrous fiasco. Later projects, however, such as the damming of the Zambezi at Kariba, were triumphantly successful.



Drilling for water was essential to the groundnut project.






An impressive fleet of mechanical diggers lifts part of  
the Tanganyika groundnut crop out of the soil. But  
not so much as one commercial nut was ever produced.  
Insufficient account had been taken of soil conditions  
and tropical pests, and after costing £36 million the  
whole ambitious project was abandoned.




## Stormy Waters at Kariba

The mighty dam at Kariba on the Zambezi River, completed in 1962, stands as an impressive though not entirely perfect tribute to British settler rule in Africa. It aroused controversy from the start. When the government of the Central African Federation (comprising Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) rejected an alternative and cheaper scheme to dam the Kafue River, African suspicions were aroused. The Kafue was in Northern Rhodesia, but Kariba lay just inside Southern Rhodesia, which was ruled by a sizable and firmly entrenched white minority. This meant that the vital machinery would remain under white control whatever political developments occurred north of the Zambezi.


The uprooting of some 50,000 Africans to make way for the world's largest man-made lake also caused trouble. Many villagers resisted the flooding of their ancestral homes and in September, 1958, nine were shot dead during an attack on police. The dam has been a source of conflict between Ian Smith's Rhodesia and independent Zambia and the Zambians are now working on a scheme to give them control over their share of electrical power from Kariba.



The massive structure of the Kariba Dam (above) bottles up the Zambezi, drawing off power to operate the great turbines in the power-house (below).



Work on the 400-foot walls of the Kartba Dam nears completion. The project cost £80 million and was designed to attract foreign investment by providing far more electricity than the Central African Federation needed for its immediate purposes.



## II. Saturday's Child Comes Home

**M**any future African leaders were in London and other Western cities in the war years. They read the enunciation of the Four Freedoms by Roosevelt and Churchill, were impressed by the upsurge of Left-wing feeling which swept Labour into power in Britain in 1945, and noted the commitment in the United Nations Charter to bring dependencies forward to self-government. Thousands of their countrymen were serving with white troops on the battlefields. These Africans experienced for the first time the equality of all men of whatever colour in the face of death and the enemy – a white enemy. Some 50,000 ex-servicemen returned to African villages with new stories to tell of the white man. This development was seminal, for it created the link that had been missing between the African intellectual and the rural masses – a link that bypassed rigid tribal custom and chiefly power.

In 1945, 36-year-old Kwame Nkrumah arrived in London from the United States. (He was baptized by the Christian name of Francis, but according to Gold Coast tradition was named Kwame, "Saturday," after the day on which he was born.) He was to be the first African to harness the new forces stirring in the continent. Having won independence for his native Gold Coast, he became the leading advocate of pan-Africanism and the most internationally prominent African of the years of the wind of change. However one judged African nationalism, it was to seem that confirmation for the judgement could be found in some aspect of Nkrumah's personality and actions. He was Westernized, nationalistic, idealistic, corrupt, educated, demagogic; a revolutionary and anti-imperialist who meddled in the affairs of other nations; charismatic leader, prime minister, president, dictator of a one-party state, and finally the victim of an army coup.

Born into the Nsima tribe in the Gold Coast in 1909, he received a conventional Roman Catholic mission education in Achimota. As a schoolmaster in Axim and Elmina in 1931–34 he was already an impressive speaker on political subjects. He then went to the United States, acquiring degrees in political science and

a B.A. in theology (he thought briefly of becoming a Jesuit). It was as an intellectual of great personal charm that he entered Left-wing circles in London. He studied law at Gray's Inn, attended lectures at the London School of Economics, and included among his friends Professor Harold Laski, Fenner Brockway the Labour M.P. and veteran anti-colonialist and George Padmore, the West Indian Marxist. It was in London that his political ideas burgeoned. His first essay into practical politics was the organization of West African students. Then, in October, 1945, he and Padmore became joint secretaries of the Fifth International Conference of the Pan-African Congress in Manchester. Nkrumah's Leninist manifesto, *Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World*, was acclaimed by the congress which was debating how best to attack colonial rule.

In the Gold Coast, J. B. Danquah organized in 1947 the United Gold Coast Convention to attack Governor Sir Alan Burns's post-war constitution for not making provision for direct election of an African majority to the Legislative Council. The new party was finding a large popular response and there was a need for a full-time secretary-general. It was proposed to Danquah that the young and brilliant Nkrumah should be asked to return to take up the post. Nkrumah had to be persuaded to go and when he did agree he found the middle-class organizers of the U.G.C.C. worried about his Marxist leanings. Once arrived, Nkrumah took a grass-roots approach. He appealed direct to the people and took up their grievances, declaring that only an African government could fully redress them. In Accra the high prices caused by post-war shortages of goods and shipping were the main issue and Nkrumah encouraged the African ex-servicemen's association to demonstrate. In 1948 riots broke out, shops were looted and mobs marched on Government House. In the fighting, 29 people were killed and 237 injured, whereupon the revolt spread throughout Accra and up-country to Kumasi. The U.G.C.C. coolly offered to take over the government and restore order. The result was that Nkrumah, Danquah and four others – "the big six" – were jailed.

On his release, Nkrumah redoubled his

efforts, in partnership with K. A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio and others, to organize a youth wing within the party and, on the Zikist model, he started a newspaper to expound his views. Other members of the convention, however, began to oppose Nkrumah's rabble-rousing methods and the breaking point was reached in 1949, by which time the youth section had become a party within a party. When Danquah reproved him before the convention committee, Nkrumah found the time was ripe to break away. His own supporters urged him, as he tells in his autobiography, to resign from the U.G.C.C. and lead them in the struggle for independence. "I realized at once," Nkrumah has written, "that they were sincere and determined. Above all, I knew they needed me to lead them."

From that day, Nkrumah's Convention People's Party became the mass nationalist movement. It had a plan for "positive action", which involved non-violent boycotts, strikes and demonstrations. But lawlessness spread and Nkrumah was jailed again on January 20, 1950, for writing seditious articles in the *Accra Evening News*. However, a more liberal constitution, well-suited to bring the C.P.P. to power, was to go into force on January 1, 1951, under the new governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. The Coussey Commission – a committee of Africans set up in 1949 to draft the new constitution – specifically designed it for "responsible government," though still with a timetable of decades in mind. Neither Coussey nor the Colonial Office saw how strong the C.P.P. had become. The new constitution gave power to any party that could sweep the board in the limited number of elected seats, and when elections were held in 1951, while Nkrumah was in prison, it was not supposed that the C.P.P. had any such potential. But the campaign was brilliantly organized by K. A. Gbedemah on a platform demanding industrialization, jobs for all, free primary education, an Attlee-type welfare state and dominion status.

The C.P.P. won 34 out of 38 elected seats, Nkrumah being elected to represent Accra, and Arden-Clarke decided to accept the verdict. He called Nkrumah direct from prison in February, 1951, to be "leader of Government business" – and


## Britain's Anti-Colonial Campaigner

Of all the African leaders I have had the privilege of knowing, Kwame Nkrumah was the most intriguing. I first met him when he was a student in London in 1945. He and George Padmore, the West Indian Marxist, used to join some of us in a Soho basement to talk about colonial and political affairs. One evening they arrived to tell us of a cable inviting Kwame to return to the Gold Coast and become secretary of the local African nationalist organization.

He was reluctant to go, arguing that the movement was controlled by non-radical middle-class leaders. But George and I persuaded him that he would have the chance to create a people's movement if he went back. And that is what he did. At first, he was utterly dedicated, over-generous. I walked with him one morning in the gardens of the Government Buildings and warned him that some of those about him were corrupt. "I cannot disown them," he replied. "When in the early years I was homeless, they gave me a bed and food." On my last visit, early in 1966, he was a lonely and seemingly fearful man hidden and well protected. We had been friends for many years and I spoke to him frankly. "Kwame," I said, "how could you have imprisoned Danquah and others? No one believes that they plotted to assassinate you." He replied that they were obstructing Socialism. "They are innocent," I persisted, "of any violent disruption." Kwame was unmoved. "Some may be," he said, "but I'm for Socialism at all costs. Better an innocent few suffer than Socialism be sabotaged."

I told him that he was making the task of his friends in England very difficult. "Perhaps you, too," he said with a smile, "are the victims of our necessity." We had lunch in the garden of Flagstaff House with some of those who were still faithful to him. It was pathetic, for his old team had disintegrated and the new circle was made up of unknowns. A few weeks later he was overthrown by the Ghanaian Army. Nkrumah epitomized the triumph and tragedy of Africa. He courageously led his people to independence and as Prime Minister he was responsible for many constructive achievements such as the Volta River project and the building of roads and hospitals. He also inspired the ideal of a United States of Africa. And although he succumbed to adulation and personal power, his name will still live as that of a great African. Another

**Lord Brockway, pictured below with Nigerian students, is a veteran anti-colonialist. A former Labour M.P., he is, at the age of 85, still President of Liberation (the Movement for Colonial Freedom). Here he discusses some of the outstanding African leaders he has known.**



outstanding leader is Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. I have described him as the Gandhi of Africa. He was distressed when events in Africa did not permit pacifism. On his visits to London he was a genial companion with a marvellous sense of humour. He laughed with African abandon as he told how, when confronted by a lion in a narrow jungle path he lifted his bicycle over his head with straight arms and stood motionless. The lion turned and fled.

Nigeria's present leader, General Gowon, compels respect. His dedication to reconciliation following the Biafran War has removed hatreds in a way no one could have believed possible. Gowon is also decisive. During the war I went with James Griffiths, Labour's Colonial Secretary under

Attlee, to both Biafra and Lagos to urge a Christmas truce as a prelude to peace. When the Information Minister, denounced me as an enemy, I felt afraid, but Gowon brushed aside the intervention, invited Griffiths and me to extend our stay and accepted the Christmas truce.

Did we in Britain help to end the colonial era or was it due to the inevitability of history? I think we did something during the years of decision to save Africa from a racial war which Iain Macleod feared. Strangely, as Colonial Secretary, Macleod asked to see me more often than any Labour Colonial Secretary had done. He knew there would be disruption and chaos after independence, but he also realized that the alternative was to repeat throughout Africa the horrors of the French war in Algeria. Resistance to Macmillan's "Wind of Change" would have invited a continental tornado.

Did we help the African nationalist leaders themselves? Certainly they said they drew great encouragement from the anti-colonial movement in Britain. The truth probably is that in the long run we influenced many of them more by our Socialist thought than by our anti-colonial campaigning, directing their minds to the kind of society they should build when independence was gained. At first, public opinion, the majority in Parliament, the Colonial Office – all were against us. But as time passed we began to sense the changing mood. The Colonial Office gave way under pressure of events and public opinion, and Parliament reflected new attitudes. The history of the African continent was revolutionized within a period of 20 years.

a year later Prime Minister – in a cabinet of five C.P.P. ministers and three officials. Arden-Clarke's instructions from Whitehall were to canalize Nkrumah into constitutional ways, braking, but not thwarting, African pressure for power. The Gold Coast's approach to independence was slowed by Nkrumah's discovery that administration is more difficult than protest politics, and that his party was not overwhelmingly accepted by all of the country. He first leaned on the governor and expatriate officials. An Anglo-African effort set the country on a rapid path to development, for which high cocoa prices provided the finance. The C.P.P. insinuated itself, however, into control of the

Cocoa Purchasing Corporation and siphoned off substantial sums of farmers' money into its own war-chest, as well as into the pockets of the party bosses; Nkrumah laid the foundations of his later vast fortune. The C.P.P. also established a new form of local taxation. The result was that the party lost its support among the Ashanti farmers, who began to turn against the southern "verandah boys." In 1954 came full internal self-government, the governor retaining only reserved powers over defence and foreign affairs. In the election that year, the C.P.P. won 71 of the 104 seats in parliament, and this convinced the British government that the time was approaching for the final

transfer of power. The opposition came from the Ashanti and the Northern territories, where distrust of Nkrumah was growing: in that election the opposition had 314,903 votes to the C.P.P.'s 391,817.

There then arose in the Gold Coast, as there was to arise in many African states when the demand for *Uhuru* – Freedom – had been granted, a sudden new demand for a federal form of government. Several C.P.P. Ashanti members deserted to the opposition National Liberation Movement, which demanded checks to the "creeping dictatorship" of Nkrumah and the C.P.P. The distrust of Nkrumah was suddenly African, not British. The violence that swept Ashanti, in protest at a



Nationalist flags of 25 African countries, many of which were still under white rule, greeted delegates to the 1958 pan-African meeting in Accra.

transfer of uncontrolled power to the C.P.P., embarrassed Whitehall but the British government was committed. It sent out Sir Frederick Bourne to devise checks and safeguards that would defend the new black democracy against overthrow, but fall short of the federalism that Nkrumah denounced as tribalism. A form of regional devolution, which entrenched the constitutional amendment procedure, was devised, and Oliver Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, persuaded (not without difficulty) everyone to accept it. Dr. Kofi Busia, the leader of the Ashanti opposition, was sufficiently satisfied to remark that they had made it very difficult for anyone to establish a dictatorship in the Gold Coast.

He was to discover how wrong he was. The Colonial Office in 1956 put the country through the test of another election, which the C.P.P. duly won again, collecting enough seats in the dissident areas – Ashanti, Togoland, the Northern Territories – for the British to conclude that the party had sufficient support throughout the country to govern by consent. It was a bitter election in which bribery and murder played their part, but the British objected to not one result. The opposition boycotted the chamber when the motion for independence was solemnly moved there. It was carried 72 to nil. London decided to risk granting independence; in any case, the risks of delay seemed far greater. On March 6, 1957, therefore, the Gold Coast became the independent state of Ghana and Nkrumah its first Prime Minister. The British trust territory of Togoland, in accord with a United Nations plebiscite of 1956, was united with the new state, the first in West Africa to win its sovereignty. In April, 1958, Nkrumah invited the seven other fully independent African states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) to Accra to discuss the liberation of the rest of Africa down to Cape Town and emphasized that Ghana's independence was meaningless if all Africa were not freed from colonialist or racialist rule.

Ghana, he made clear, was to become not just a small cocoa republic but a base for liberating and energizing a new and mighty Africa. In a 1958 tour of the free African states and America, Nkrumah

proclaimed his mission. He visited Jawaharlal Nehru and congratulated India on consolidating “the independence you fought for and won,” and revealed his hope for a union of African states that would produce an African power comparable to India. On his return to Ghana, Nkrumah presided over an even more significant gathering: the All-African People's Conference, to which the nationalist parties and leaders of the colonies in Africa were invited. Among those to attend were Tom Mboya, of Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda, of Northern Rhodesia, Hastings Banda, of Nyasaland, Patrice Lumumba, of the Congo and many others, English-, French- and Portuguese-speaking. The conference agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in Ghana to co-ordinate the efforts of all nationalist parties to achieve freedom and to work for “the ultimate achievement of a Union or Commonwealth of African states.” To set an example, Nkrumah and Sékou Touré, president of the former French territory of Guinea, proclaimed a union of their two states in May, 1959. But, like so many other unions to be earnestly discussed by Africans in the years ahead, it stopped short of the one critical act – the transfer of the separate sovereignties to a new federal entity.

Nkrumah's ambitions for a “continental government” to be sited in Accra never diminished and he tried to create a new personality: “Nkrumah of Africa.” He sought to make himself the embodiment of the “African personality” in the world, and his country the launching-pad for this new force in world affairs. In 1960 Ghana became a republic with Nkrumah as executive president. The further from Ghana, however, the more impressive Nkrumah's image: at home the process whereby the constitution was swept away and total power vested in the president was causing resistance. Nor did Nkrumah's vision ever materialize. The Organization of African Unity, set up by 30 countries in May, 1963, with its secretariat in Addis Ababa, was the most concrete pan-African achievement. But Nkrumah always felt it to be a poor substitute, an opinion he had of any regional grouping, such as those of the former French states. In his view the “continental government” of his dreams could alone

prevent the “Balkanization” of Africa. But he intrigued in West African politics to an extent that made him unpopular; and on February 24, 1966 the army took over while he was in Peking.

Meanwhile, in neighbouring Nigeria Britain had been attempting to merge diverse tribes in a single large state with a federal constitution on the Australian model. Such a constitution had been proposed by Governor Sir Arthur Richards in 1945 and was introduced on New Year's Day, 1947. It provided for a measure of self-government, more African representation and provincial assemblies. Yet, from the first, despite superficial attractions, it was disliked by the Africans: it had been devised without any consultation, and by 1947 the educated Africans and the ex-servicemen wanted not just more of their compatriots in positions of authority, but representatives elected by popular vote. It was the first of four constitutions to be introduced in ten years.

From the first, the new Nigerian political leadership was tribal in nature. Chief Awolowo went into politics to promote Yoruba claims in the west against the self-assertive Ibo intellectuals of Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, which dominated the east. Awolowo founded Egbe Omo Oduwa, which, in 1951, became the Action Group party, splitting from Azikiwe's National Council. In the north, fears, perhaps shared by the British, of a southern inter-tribal bloc emerging in spite of the Yoruba-Ibo rivalry prompted the creation that same year of the Northern People's Congress party. The chief inspirer of this group was Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It was composed mainly of Hausa and Fulani and the northern movement took the form of an Islamic nationalism, based on a determination to maintain the north's countervailing power in terms of area and population within any federal régime. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna (warrior-prince) of Sokoto, rapidly took over as the dominant figure, aided by his emirs. Mallam Amino Kano at first was allied with Bello but later broke to form a radical northern party which then allied itself with the southerners. Thus the scene was already set for the tribal and regional rivalry which would erupt at independence.

# THE REDEEMER

For nearly 20 years Dr. Kwame Nkrumah was the trail-blazer of African nationalism. After studying in America and at the London School of Economics, he returned to West Africa in 1948 as secretary of the nationalist United Gold Coast Convention Party. But its policy was too moderate for Nkrumah and within six months he had founded his own Convention People's Party whose slogan was "Self-Government Now!" Imprisoned because of his call for non-violent but "positive" action, he saw his party sweep to power in elections to a new legislative assembly in 1951 and was released from jail to assume office as the Empire's first African prime minister. In 1957 the Gold Coast won independence as Ghana and Nkrumah took the title of *Osagyefo* – Redeemer – for his self-appointed rôle as leader of all black Africa.



West African students in London (left) flock round Nkrumah during his 1951 visit. As leader of the new Gold Coast government, he was seeking skilled personnel such as doctors and engineers.




A jubilant Nkrumah (right) greets welcoming crowds as he arrives for a session of parliament on March 6, 1957 – the first day of Ghana's independence.

Nkrumah's statue (right) outside Accra's parliament stood – until his downfall – as a symbol of his authority in black Africa.







Kwame Nkrumah stands at ease in 1961 among spruce Ghanaian cadets training at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, England. Ironically, it was the officers of Ghana's army who were to bring about Nkrumah's downfall five years later.

Closely attended by dutiful followers, Nkrumah steps forward to open a new bridge in the early 1960s. Vast building projects were dear to Nkrumah's heart for they helped him to project a grand and dynamic image to the rest of Africa.




As a token of his popularity Nkrumah's portrait was widely displayed, even on the bright cotton dresses of Ghanaian women.

## The Colossus Crashes

"Our task is not done and our own safety is not assured," proclaimed Kwame Nkrumah soon after Ghana's independence in 1957, "until the last vestiges of colonialism have been swept from Africa." For the next nine years Nkrumah attempted to fulfil that task, aiding anti-colonial groups, welcoming dissidents from other African states of which he disapproved and snatching headlines for his attacks on "Western Imperialism."

An indefatigable exponent of African unity, Nkrumah sponsored numerous pan-African conferences and in 1963 saw the establishment of the Organization of African Unity with its headquarters in Addis Ababa. Nearer home, Nkrumah took Ghana into a union with the neighbouring independent state of Guinea in 1959. But beneath the impressive façade his position was weakening. Other African régimes resented his meddling in their affairs and in Ghana there was increasing opposition to his autocratic rule and sumptuous life style.

Sharp practice and bribery during elections and roughshod treatment of political opponents convinced many that Ghana was in the grip of a ruthless tyranny. In February, 1966, the army staged a coup while Nkrumah was on a visit to Peking. The once munificent host to Africa's exiles himself became an exile, finding refuge in Guinea. In April, 1972, he died while undergoing medical treatment in Bucharest for cancer of the liver.



A Ghanaian student smashes a bust of Lenin in protest against the Communist sympathies of Ghana's deposed leader.





WE SUPPORT THE NEW TUC LEADSHIP

Kwame Nkrumah  
Kofiwia DKOOR  
Se waha HUK

MODERN FURNITURE

WHERE IS THE PEOPLE'S MONEY?

NO MORE ANIMAL FARM

WE DEMAND TRIAL OF NKRUHMAH

THANK YOU MR. J.E.O. NUNOO

C.P.P. DIED FOREVER NOW

LONG LIVE KOTON

KOFI WEAH YOUR TRIAL AWAITS ALIAS NKRUHMAH

WE HAVE BELLED THE CAT  
NKRUHMAH

LONG NATIONAL LIBERATION

### III. Breaking the White Barrier

**B**y 1949 a reforming British Governor, Sir John Macpherson, decided, after consultation with all the Nigerian leaders, that a parliamentary federation was the most desirable objective. But the vexed question arose as to the actual division of powers between the states or regions and the centre, as well as the number and size of the actual regions. The British always pressed for a strong centre, but the north and the Yoruba wanted a weak centre; Awolowo wanted the three regions of the old British administrative division broken up into smaller states, but the northerners and the British opposed this. In particular, the Sardauna threatened to secede if any attempt was made to weaken his authority or to offer self-determination to the non-Muslim tribes of the "middle belt" of Nigeria. On this issue, central to Nigeria's diversity, the evolution of an independent country by 1960 depended and it was these problems that delayed Nigerian independence until three years after Ghana's: the first date demanded (by Awolowo's lieutenant, Chief Enahoro) was 1956, a year ahead of Ghana.

Conferences succeeded each other as the British struggled to find compromises between the rival Nigerians who imperiously demanded independence but rejected the terms their colleagues put forward for it. Everyone blamed Britain for not backing their demand, and the final compromise intensified regional bitterness. Many considered it an example of British neo-colonialism, although its terms would seem to have been dictated by the Sardauna. The compromise was reached at a conference in London in May and June of 1957 which was attended by representatives of all Nigerian political parties. Several offices were abolished although the Governor was to remain as president – but Balewa was named as the first Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria. Balewa was genuinely devoted (one of the few politicians who was) to Nigerian unity. He formed a coalition of the three main parties, but was faced with the impossible task of reconciling regional demands and personalities. The Sardauna had skilfully played on tribal jealousies and retained the north intact, thereby ensuring that northern M.P.s were bound

to dominate the federal chamber. Balewa, who was not of princely origin, had the further disadvantage of being thought by many to be the puppet of the Sardauna, who, remaining as northern Prime Minister, described him as "my lieutenant."

The British defied pressure for early independence before the north had organized itself to meet the southern challenge by transferring to the eastern and western regions internal self-government within the federal structure of 1953, and they were, in a limited sense, on a par with Ghana by 1957. (The north was granted internal self-government in 1959.) Immediately the two dominant parties of the southern regions, the Action Group, led by Awolowo, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, led by Azikiwe, proceeded, exactly as in Ghana, to fill the party coffers and many of the leaders' pockets, by helping themselves to public funds. With these resources, a bitter inter-party battle was at once waged in both regions despite the federal coalition government.


Initially, this struggle was undertaken with the main aim of winning power at the centre in the 1959 federal elections, which Macmillan decided to apply as the test of which party or coalition should control the centre. Independence was granted to an N.P.C.-N.C.N.C. Coalition on November 1, 1960. Azikiwe became governor-general, declaring: "My major life's work is done. My country is now free, and I have been honoured to be its first indigenous head of state. What more could one desire in life?" Abubakar Balewa was knighted for his skill and his moderate line; his farewell to the colonial service was quoted in Whitehall with enthusiasm up to the day of his assassination by army mutineers in 1966: "I pay tribute to the manner in which successive British governments have gradually transferred the burden of responsibility to our shoulders. . . . We are grateful to the British officers who we have known, first as masters, then as leaders and finally as partners, but always as friends."

The realities of Nigerian politics took some time to reveal themselves to British observers. The country's leaders seemed for a while stable and moderate: they were, in fact, ruthless party bosses determined to destroy the official opposition,

Awolowo's Action Group. First, the western state, where the Action Group still had a majority, was split in two, the new Mid-West state being taken under the control of the Zikist N.C.N.C.; then the Action Group itself was split and made subservient, under S.K. Akintola, to the government at Lagos, after a period in which the state was ruled (on a rather specious argument) by a federal administrator with no local government at all. In 1962 Chief Awolowo was charged with an attempt to subvert the constitution by force – in despair, it was said at his trial, of achieving in any legitimate way his ambition of becoming Prime Minister in Sir Abubakar's place. He and Chief Enahoro were imprisoned, and, ironically, were thereby saved from assassination when the army overthrew all the regional and central governments in 1966. To them, at the end of the day, came high office under the rebels, Generals Ironsi and Gowon. They were almost the only survivors of the nationalists who won independence for Nigeria and power for its élite.

But in 1960 this event, and the ensuing secession of Biafra (the Ibo-controlled east) and civil war, were undreamed of in Britain. In that year, a number of French African colonies became independent as France hastened to put her own empire

Nigeria's Chief Awolowo sports the badge of his Action Group party, formed in 1951 to assert Yoruba tribal interests. Independence did nothing to ease tribal antagonisms and in 1962 Awolowo was imprisoned for trying to overthrow the Federal government by force.





Ibo followers of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons lend musical support to their candidates at the elections of 1959.

on a "commonwealth" basis. The real warning of the problems facing post-colonial Africa came not from Nigeria but from the Belgian Congo, which collapsed into civil war and anarchy a few days after King Baudouin handed independence to President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba in June, 1960. The débâcle was ascribed by Nkrumah to neo-colonialist intrigues. The British government attributed it to the failure of the Belgians to give to the Congo the thorough education in political responsibility that had been received by Nkrumah, Sir Abubakar, Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone, which was to become independent in 1961, and the other officials, civil servants and politicians of the British West African territories.

To many British politicians and businessmen, West Africa was one thing, East, Central and Southern Africa – "white Africa" – quite another. They rationalized the speed with which Ghana and Nigeria attained independence on the grounds that these countries had been in contact with Europe for 300 years, producing a long (if thin) line of professional people for generations. But much of the rest of Africa had, in the British view, been in the Stone Age until the 20th Century. It followed that what happened in West Africa was no precedent for other parts of the continent, particularly Kenya and Rhodesia with their comparatively large white populations. This was a belief which the All-African People's Conference should have dissolved. The speed of air-

craft and radio communication meant that Africans everywhere followed closely their "brothers'" progress elsewhere and measured their own by it. The Africans did not accept that the number of black graduates had anything to do with colonial policy and independence. To them, the white settlers constituted the real hurdle. Macmillan on his 1960 tour drew a sharp distinction, however, between East Africa, which he saw must soon become independent "on an African basis" and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

British policy in the late 1950s crystallized around the concept of leading East and Central Africa slowly to independence on a basis of multi-racialism: that is, by evolving constitutions that would balance the power held by elected African and

A young army lieutenant, Alexander Nyirenda, lights a torch on the snow-clad summit of Mount Kilimanjaro at midnight on December 8, 1961, to mark the independence of Tanganyika. Behind him flies the flag of the new sovereign state.



elected European (and Asian) representatives in the legislatures. This meant that "one man one vote," which became the rule in West Africa by around 1955, was not to be the rule elsewhere; African electorates were to be restricted by property or educational qualifications so as not to overwhelm the other communities by sheer weight of numbers and voting power. Africans easily demonstrated the illogicality of this distinction between East and West. What, they asked, was the difference between the "primitives" of Northern Nigeria or Uganda, who got the vote, and those of Kenya and Rhodesia who did not? It was clear the British were happy enough with one man one vote, or something near it, in Zanzibar or Uganda in the East, where there were no white settlers. But even in Tanganyika, where there were very few Europeans, the colonial power sought to devalue the black vote. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office thought the process of "liberalizing" these franchises could be kept slow, while the white settlers in their turn could be "liberalized" in their attitude to Africans. It was an egregiously wrong notion on both counts. In the event, within seven years of Ghana's independence, the white settlers were everywhere reduced to political impotence and, indeed, often under order of expulsion – with one salient exception: Southern Rhodesia.

A group of remarkable African leaders broke the barrier: Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, Hastings Banda in Nyasaland and Kenneth Kaunda in Northern Rhodesia. Against them were ranged a group of tough Europeans: but the Africans defeated Sir Roy Welensky in the Federation and the liberal Michael Blundell in Kenya; only Ian Smith defies them in Rhodesia. There it was the African leader, Joshua Nkomo, who found himself defeated and in detention. The Central African Federation was created in 1953, partly to prevent Southern Rhodesia being drawn into the orbit of South Africa, where the Afrikaner Nationalists had taken power in 1948, and partly to erect a multi-racial buffer state between the potentially antagonistic blocs of black and white Africa. Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, became the federal capital and

the power lay with the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia, not with the two British protectorates, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, except insofar as they legally remained under ultimate British control. In Southern Rhodesia the whites kept the power in their hands by a franchise with property qualifications too high for most Africans. They achieved the same object throughout the Federation with the same means. In the protectorates Africans were excluded from effective control by less sophisticated constitutions which enabled the governors to dictate events. Both constitutions, however, were subject to change by Whitehall, and were the key to the situation.

Such safeguards for African interests as were built into the federal constitution were ignored, but in 1957 the Federation was given full autonomy over its internal affairs and much power externally short of formal independence. It seemed to Africans that in a short time the Federation, under the new Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, who had succeeded Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern), would obtain independence on the same basis as South Africa won self-government in 1910 and independence in 1931 – an independence in which the blacks had no share. "Had any of us realized," Macmillan wrote subsequently, "the almost revolutionary way in which the situation would develop, and the rapid growth of African nationalism throughout the whole African continent, I think I should have opposed the putting together of three countries so opposite in their character and so different in their history." In 1959 Macmillan as Prime Minister had to face the consequences of this misreading of the future. Nyasaland was in a state of revolt, and Northern Rhodesia was going the same way. Unless Britain was physically to repress the African protest the Federation had to be dismantled. Welensky, the former engine driver and ex-prize fighter, was determined to defend it. Banda, the ex-medical practitioner, and Kaunda, the ex-schoolmaster, were determined to destroy it.

Hastings Banda was born in 1905. As a young man he had left his bush village and walked to Johannesburg where he worked in the mines until he attracted

the interest of missionaries, and was sent, at the age of 29, to the United States for education. There he decided to become a missionary doctor of the Scottish Church, and after qualifying at Meharry Medical College, Nashville, Tenn., went to Glasgow and Edinburgh to study for British qualifications. By then, however, although he was an elder of the Kirk, he had decided to abandon missionary work; instead, he started general practice in Liverpool and on Tyneside during the Second World War and in London from 1945 to 1953. There was no sign of his being imbued with African nationalism in this period. Indeed, until 1953 he believed that benign Colonial Office rule was best for his people until a lengthy period of development and education had prepared them for autonomy within the British Empire. The Federation changed his mind.

Nyasaland had long had an African Congress party, but one of moderate ambitions. Fatally, the governor did not consult it, and the Nyasa chiefs came to London in 1953 to protest against being put under settler rule after the long sense of security as trustees of the Colonial Office. They were heard but overruled, and Banda allied himself with them, knowing that many British people disliked the Federation and distrusted both Huggins and Welensky. The Nyasa cause failed and, disgusted with Britain, and apparently no longer interested in politics, Banda went to the Gold Coast to practise medicine. But in Nyasaland, the fight against the Federation was only just beginning. A group of young men working through the Congress party were determined to mobilize the masses. However, they lacked a charismatic leader to rouse the people against the federal power, its white troops and its white-officered police. This, they believed, would alone convince the Colonial Office that it must change course. They sought out Banda in Kumasi, and persuaded him, at the time of the preparations for the 1958 All-African People's Conference, to become the messiah of his country – Malawi, as they wished it to be called. Banda finally accepted, and it was as the saviour who had spent 40 years abroad and both understood and practised the white man's medicine, that he returned. At Salisbury

he was asked what sort of leader he would be and said: "Moderates have never achieved anything. It took extremists like Oliver Cromwell and Mrs. Pankhurst to get things done." When he landed in Blantyre, Nyasaland, he found the people worshipping him. He became leader of the Nyasaland African Congress party and his power was from the first far greater than Nkrumah's.

Banda's inflammatory speeches against "this stupid federation" soon frightened the government and early in 1959 it was alleged that a Mau Mau-style uprising was being planned. The federal government declared a state of emergency and sent in federal troops. Banda's party was outlawed and he and his colleagues were imprisoned. This was followed on March 2-3, 1959, by nationalist rioting in which 32 Africans were killed by security forces. A subsequent inquiry, headed by Mr. Justice Patrick Devlin, found that there had been no "murder plot" as the police had alleged. Colonial Secretary Sir Alan Lennox-Boyd was annoyed but refused to resign at this rebuff. In October, however, he retired in favour of Iain Macleod, a man of pronounced liberal views, who saw clearly that the Federation was doomed.

Banda was released from prison on April 1, 1960, and five days later went to London to discuss self-government for Nyasaland. In July and August of that year conferences in London decided that 100,000 Africans would be enfranchised and made provisions for an African majority in the Federation's legislature. Banda said he would support the new constitution. The Monckton Commission, set up in 1959 to study the future of the Federation, reported to the British government on October 11, 1960. It opposed breaking up the Federation, but recommended that each territory should have the right to secede after achieving self-government. Welensky opposed the recommendation and for a while had an ally in Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys (who later had to change his line to conform to Macmillan's).

Elections under the new franchise were held in Nyasaland in August, 1961, giving Banda and the Malawi Congress party a comfortable victory: an African majority was elected for the first time to the Legislative Council and the result was

a state within a state. As the governor still held reserve power, Banda could only demand secession, not effect it. But he could and did boycott his own federal capital and refuse co-operation with federal officials. Within the Federation there was mounting African opposition to some changes which had been agreed upon in the constitution and Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic party in Southern Rhodesia was banned in December in an attempt to quieten the protests. But most ominous for the federalists was the certainty that Northern Rhodesia would follow the same line as Nyasaland when or if an African government took power - and the Northern Rhodesian constitution was due for a similar change to that which Macleod had made in Nyasaland.

The federalists had always valued Northern Rhodesia far more than Nyasaland. Welensky had called Nyasaland "an Imperial slum" and originally the settlers had tried to keep it out of the Federation. Northern Rhodesia's copper was what they wanted, but the Colonial Office had considered that Nyasaland should also get some of its benefits. There were some 75,000 whites in the copper belt and along the "line of rail" from Bulawayo, and Welensky (a Northern Rhodesian) and his United Federal party had a chance of retaining power if they could also retain the qualified franchise for the two million Africans. But in Northern Rhodesia, too, there had emerged an African leader destined to break white control. Kenneth Kaunda was born in 1924 in Bemba country (though his family originated in Nyasaland). A strict Christian and abstainer (even from tea and coffee) he was also a tireless organizer of the African National Congress, which he joined in the early 1950s. So tireless that where there had seemed no political interest, it burgeoned overnight: Kaunda even made the planting of a "coronation tree" in 1953 in his local village into a protest against racial discrimination. He became secretary-general of the Northern Rhodesia Congress in 1956, studied political science in Britain under the aegis of the Labour party and attended the All-African People's Conference in Accra.

He broke with the conservative policies

of the existing African National Congress party, led by Harry Nkumbula, in 1957, and became the leader of the United National Independence party, which followed the Banda pattern in organizing boycotts, strikes and demonstrations. Like Banda, Kaunda knew there was no future in moderation. He saw that the British government yielded to the pressures exerted by Welensky, until the Africans developed even more persuasive counter-pressures - and this could only be done by threats of riots and violent protest. This worked upon British reluctance to repress violence with violence. Kaunda threatened that unless independence was promised in a reasonable time, and secession considered, he would be helpless to stem a popular uprising compared with which Mau Mau would be a "child's picnic."

"Positive action," in fact, led to sporadic violence in 1958 and 1959. Like Banda, Kaunda and his lieutenants such as Simon Kapwepwe were detained. In 1960 violence died down and the struggle was joined with Macleod, Sandys and



Children run down the steps of Uganda's parliament waving their country's new flag.



Welensky over a territorial constitution under which the blacks could win power. A British white paper of February, 1961, proposed constitutional changes which would have made an African-dominated government possible. Welensky, however, with the aid of Sandys, persuaded Macmillan to modify the vital provisions. Macleod and Sandys were working against each other, Macmillan apparently holding aloof until he had judged that his party realized the hopelessness of maintaining the federalist case. Then, in 1962, Macmillan put Deputy Prime Minister R. A. Butler, perhaps his ablest colleague, in charge of Central African affairs. Northern Rhodesian parliamentary elections, held in October, 1962, resulted in an impasse. Welensky's party won 15 seats, Kaunda's 14, Nkumbula's five and the remaining seven seats were deadlocked. New elections in December, however, produced a situation whereby the Africans could take power – provided Kaunda and Nkumbula formed a coalition. They did so, and, with the support of a few white liberals, the Africans had a legislative majority in Northern Rhodesia for the first time. Kaunda and Nkumbula soon quarrelled, but their government meant the end of the Federation. It only remained for Butler to arrange the formalities of its dissolution.

Welensky saw that with the overthrow of white control in Northern Rhodesia, the position of the Federation was hopeless. Butler tried (or seemed to try) to persuade Kaunda and Banda to operate a loose confederation of the three countries, which might, perhaps, have been better for Nkomo and the Southern Rhodesian nationalists, but they refused. The Monckton Commission had admitted that secession could not be prevented, and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia meant to secede. On December 31, 1963, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved. Under Banda's premiership, Nyasaland became the independent state of Malawi on July 6, 1964, and three months later Northern Rhodesia received independence as Zambia under a government headed by Kenneth Kaunda.

Welensky had co-operated loyally with the British in dismantling the Federation and had returned to southern Rhodesia



The Duchess of Kent, representing the Queen, and Uganda Governor-General, Sir Walter Coutts, join Ugandan premier Milton Obote for independence celebrations in Kampala in October, 1962.

in an attempt to steer a moderate political course. He failed. His party had been defeated in the elections of December, 1962, by the white supremacist Rhodesian Front and Winston J. Field succeeded Sir Edgar Whitehead as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. On April 14, 1964, Field himself was replaced by Ian D. Smith, who represented the Right wing of the Rhodesian Front, and just two days later Nkomo and three other African

nationalist leaders were banished without trial. Refused early and unqualified sovereignty, it remained only for Smith and his government to seize it illegally with their Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November, 1965. For many former members of Britain's African Empire, the way in which Britain finally resolves this white settler rebellion will be the ultimate test of her ability to come to terms with the Wind of Change.

# ANGRY PARTNERS

In September, 1953, Britain brought about a federation between the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia and the neighbouring protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was argued that the three would form a powerful economic bloc, with the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia providing wealth, the whites of Southern Rhodesia supplying skilled manpower and the blacks of Nyasaland acting as a reservoir of unskilled labour. Politically, federation was intended to be an exercise in multi-racial partnership and was described by Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton as "a turning point in the history of Africa."

But African opinion, ignored when the federation was set up, remained sceptical, and suspicions deepened when Sir Godfrey Huggins, the first federal Prime Minister, indiscreetly likened the partnership to that of horse and rider. Inflamed by the anti-federation campaign of the black nationalist leader, Dr. Hastings Banda, the Africans grew more discontented – and the whites more fearful. Early in 1959 the federal government declared a state of emergency, mobilized troops, and arrested Banda and his colleagues.



Federal Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky (centre) strides to Whitehall for talks on the 1959 crisis.

African political prisoners in Nyasaland (right) are forced to line up. At the feet of each are two blankets, a mug and a plate.



Southern Rhodesian troops push through





high elephant grass on patrol in Nyasaland, centre of African unrest in 1959.

Kayama Chiume (centre), a close aide of Dr. Hastings Banda, carries a placard during a demonstration in London in March, 1959, urging the nationalist leader's release from detention in Nyasaland.





Five former members of the Northern Rhodesian government pose after resigning in 1961 in protest at British constitutional proposals.

## The Federation Collapses

The ruthless clamp-down on African political activities in 1959 was designed to assure the federation's survival. Instead, it paved the way for the federation's downfall. Charged with ultimate responsibility for the three Central African territories, the British government became increasingly uneasy at the suppression of black aspirations. In April, 1960, therefore, it ordered Hastings Banda's release from prison and made constitutional changes that enabled him to win effective power in Nyasaland the following summer. To the chagrin of Sir Roy Welensky's federal government, African nationalists also won control of Northern Rhodesia in December, 1962. With two unwilling partners in the federation the next step was only a matter of time.

In March, 1963, Welensky came to London to be informed by R. A. Butler, the minister in charge of Central African affairs, that all members of the federation were to be granted the right to secede. In a bitter reply, Welensky rejected his earlier invitation to lunch with the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan: "I cannot accept," he said, "the hospitality of a man who has betrayed me and my country." At midnight on December 31 the Central African Federation was dissolved and the following year Nyasaland became the independent state of Malawi and Northern Rhodesia achieved independence as Zambia. Only Southern Rhodesia remained as a formidable bastion of white supremacy.

Southern Rhodesia's black nationalist leader, Joshua Nkomo, addressing a mass rally in the Tanganyikan capital of Dar es Salaam, calls on Africans to "kill this rat imperialism."






Africans in Blantyre, Nyasaland (left), shed crocodile tears over the coffin of the Central African Federation, which came to an end on December 31, 1963. The coffin was later carried off (below) to be ceremoniously burnt after a "funeral oration" by Dr. Banda, Nyasaland's voluble Prime Minister.





Rhodesia's Joshua Nkomo, detained since 1964, stands outside his hut – a far cry from the plush offices of those nationalists who won power.



*An Infantry sergeant, 1792*

